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Summary: Risk measures have been studied for several decades in the actuarial literature, where
they appeared under the guise of premium calculation principles. Risk measures and properties
that risk measures should satisfy have recently received considerable attention in the ﬁnancial
mathematics literature. Mathematically, a risk measure is a mapping from a class of random
variables to the real line. Economically, a risk measure should capture the preferences of the
decision-maker.
This paper complements the study initiated in Denuit, Dhaene & Van Wouwe (1999) and
considers several theories for decision under uncertainty: the classical expected utility paradigm,
Yaari’s dual approach, maximin expected utility theory, Choquet expected utility theory and Quig-
gin’s rank-dependent utility theory. Building on the actuarial equivalent utility pricing principle,
broad classes of risk measures are generated, of which most classical risk measures appear to be
particular cases. This approach shows that most risk measures studied recently in the ﬁnancial
mathematics literature disregard the utility concept (i.e., correspond to linear utilities), restricting
their applicability. Some alternatives proposed in the literature are discussed.
1 Introduction and motivation
1.1 The need for risk measures
One of the major needs for risk measures is related to pricing in incomplete markets.
In complete ﬁnancial markets, hedging and arbitrage-free pricing are two sides of the
same problem: the arbitrage-free price of a contingent claim equals the price of the
hedging (in this case: replicating) portfolio. When the market is incomplete, however,
there may be no replicating portfolio and the hedging strategy could involve a risky
position. Moreover, there exists an inﬁnite number of martingale measures and each of
them generates a different price for the contingent claim. This leads to a set of possible
prices. Now, since the hedging of the contingent claim involves risk, the price of the
hedging portfolio depends explicitly on the agent’s attitude towards risk.
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2 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
Note that the problem of market incompleteness is particularly relevant in insurance.
This is due to several reasons: the stochastic nature of insurance processes (with jumps),
the fact that many insurance risks are not actively traded in the (ﬁnancial) market and
the fact that securitized insurance risks often have an underlying index rather than an
underlying traded asset.
Recent years have witnessed the emergence in the ﬁnancial mathematics literature of
a sophisticated theory of risk measures. However, risk measures have been extensively
studied in the actuarial literature for more than 30 years, under the guise of premium
calculation principles; see, e.g., B¨ uhlmann (1970) and Goovaerts, De Vijlder & Haezen-
donck (1984). A risk measure is deﬁned as a mapping from a class of random variables
deﬁned on a measurable space (representing the risks at hand) to the real numbers.
1.2 How to deﬁne a risk measure?
There are basically two ways to deﬁne a particular risk measure. In both cases, a set
of axioms is given, but the axioms either describe how the risk is measured or describe
how individuals make their decisions under risk or uncertainty. More speciﬁcally, this
means that we can either axiomatize a risk measure directly by imposing axioms (e.g.,
with respect to ordering and aggregation, such as those discussed in Section 1.3 below)
on random variables, or we can axiomatize a functional representing preferences (which
in fact is also a risk measure) and use economic indifference arguments to obtain risk
measures.Theaxiomsin(actuarialandﬁnancial)mathematicsarejustphraseddifferently
fromtheaxiomsineconomics.In(actuarialandﬁnancial)mathematicsweimposeaxioms
on random variables (risks) whereas in economics we impose axioms on acts. That the
two approaches coincide is explained nicely by F¨ ollmer & Schied (2004). Let us now
brieﬂy explain these two approaches.
First, a set of axiomsforrisk measurementcan be giventhat is regardedasreasonable
in the situation under consideration. Then, the form of the risk measure is deduced from
the agreed axioms. Risk measures are appropriate if, and only if, their characterizing
axioms are. Axiomatizations can then be used to justify a risk measure but also to
criticize it.
Second, a paradigm for decision under uncertainty can be selected, for instance
the Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory, Yaari’s dual utility theory or
other generalized utility principles, for instance. Note that this selection also amounts to
opting for a set of axioms, but this set explains how decision-makers choose between
uncertain prospects; see, e.g., Wakker (2004) for more details. The risk measure is
then obtained by an equivalence principle: the decision-maker is indifferent between
the cash-ﬂow  [X]−X (corresponding to the case where X is covered) and 0 (no
coverage).
Both approaches for measuring risk will be considered in this paper. It will be seen
that many classical risk measures can be obtained in both ways, which allows for a better
understanding of their intrinsic properties. This will also enlighten the fact that most
risk measures studied recently in the ﬁnancial mathematics literature disregard utilities
(considering only linear utility functions). This restriction explains some problems, like




































































































































































































1.3 The axiomatic approach to risk measurement
Axioms to characterize a risk measure can generally be divided into three classes: ratio-
nality axioms,additivityaxiomsandtechnicalaxioms. First there are the basic rationality
axioms such as monotonicity, which are satisﬁed by most risk measures. Additivity
axioms deal with sums of risks. They describe the sensitivity of the risk measure with re-
spect to risk aggregation.Let usmentiontheadditivityforindependentrandomvariables,
theadditivityforco-monotonicrandomvariables,thesubadditivityorthesuperadditivity.
These additivity requirementsoften are the most characteristic for the correspondingrisk
measure.Finally,therearetechnicalrequirements,mostlycontinuityconditions.Theyare
usually necessary for obtainingmathematical proofsand are typically difﬁcult to validate
or to explain economically.
Let us now detail some of the properties that risk measures may or may not satisfy:
Objectivity The risk measure   does not depend on the risk itself but only on its under-
lying distribution, i.e.  [X]= [FX] where FX is the distribution function of X.
The objectivity requirement implies that risk measurement can be entirely based on
distributionfunctions.This is usuallythe case in actuarialscience. Thisconditionensures
that FX contains all the information needed to measure the riskiness of X. This property
is sometimescalled “law invariance”,and phrased as X =d Y ⇒  [X]= [Y] where =d
denotes the equality in distribution.
Two monotonicityrequirementscan then be envisaged:either we impose that the risk
measure   agrees with almost sure comparisons (weak monotonicity) or with stochastic
dominance  st (strong monotonicity).
Weak monotonicity For any X and Y, P[X ≤ Y]=1 implies  [X] ≤  [Y].
Strong monotonicity For any X and Y such that X  st Y,i . e .P[X > t]≤P[Y > t] for
all t ∈ R, implies  [X]≤ [Y].
Co-monotonicity is a useful notion in decision theory; see, for example, the review
papers by Dhaene, Denuit, Goovaerts, Kaas & Vyncke (2002a,b) and the references
therein. Recall that the random variables X and Y are said to be co-monotonic if they
satisfy
P[X ≤ x,Y ≤ y]=min

P[X ≤ x], P[Y ≤ y]

for all x, y ∈ R.
For two co-monotonic random variables X and Y,w eh a v et h a tX  st Y ⇔ P[X ≤ Y]
= 1. In the absence of co-monotonicity,weak monotonicitywill not imply strong mono-
tonicity. However, if   is objective, then both requirements have the same force. We
refer the reader to B¨ auerle & M¨ uller (2006) for a careful examination of objectivity and
monotonicity properties.
Positive homogeneity For any a > 0,  [aX] = a [X].
In the literature it is often stated that positive homogeneity is equivalent with currency
independency. This is however a wrong interpretation. Take as an example  [X]=



































































































































































































4 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
fromdollarsto eurosonlymakessense ifalso d ischangedinthatway),butnotpositively
homogeneous.Hence, positive homogeneityis about multiplying all euro amountsof the
claims by a constant factor. Let us also mention that future currencies are random so
that the constant a involved in the deﬁnition of positive homogeneity cannot be used to
convert X from euros to dollars, say. It is rather related to the “volume” of the risk and
has a close relation with additivity for co-monotonic risks (see below).
Translation equivariance For any b ∈ R,  [X + b] =  [X] + b.
Translation equivariance might be considered desirable for a risk measure   used to
calculateprovisionsorpremiums.Indeedit seemstobereasonablewhentheriskcontains
a certain amountb that  [b+ X]=b+ [X] in both cases. This is of course not the case
for risk measures used for the calculation of solvency (regulatory or economic) capital.
These quantities constitute amounts of money for safety, in addition to the provisions
and premiums. Such risk measures are of the form   [X]=  [(X −  [X])+] for some
appropriate risk measures    and  . Consequently, if   is translation equivariant then   
satisﬁes   [X + b]=  [X], so that we have translation invariance in this case. It is of
course not forbidden to take translation equivariance as an axiom for the construction
of risk measures in this situation, but it cannot be interpreted in the economic concept
of solvency. The prescribed rules in the framework of Solvency 2 for the calculation
of solvency capital (the difference between the Value-at-Risk at level 99.5% and the
Value-at-Risk at level 75%) recognizes this reality. Related of course is the requirement
 [b]=b which can be defended in the case of insurance pricing (to avoid free lunches
and/or the no-ripoffcondition) but in the deﬁnition of a risk measure  [b] might be equal
to a function u(b), the utility.
Combining positive homogeneity with translation equivariance guarantees that   is
linear, that is, whatever a > 0,  [aX + b]=a [X]+b.
Subadditivity  [X + Y] ≤  [X] +  [Y] whatever the dependency structure of X
and Y.
The rationale behind subadditivity can be summarized as “a merger does not create
extra risk”. Subadditivity reﬂects the idea that risk can be reduced by diversiﬁcation.
Accordingto Rootzen & Kl¨ uppelberg(1999),subadditivityis a convenientmathematical
property that does not hold in reality. The behavior of a risk measure with respect to
the aggregation of risks is manifested by the award of diversiﬁcation discounts and the
imposition of penalties.
When equality holds, we speak of additivity. In this case, the dependence struc-
ture between X and Y is often speciﬁed: for example, additivity for independent risks
or additivity for co-monotonic risks (see below). We refer the interested reader to
Dhaene, Laeven, Vanduffel, Darkiewicz & Goovaerts (2004) for a detailed discussion
on the desirability of the subadditivity axiom when setting solvency capital require-
ments.
InArtzner,Delbaen,Eber&Heath(1999),ariskmeasurethatsatisﬁesthepropertiesof
monotonicity, positive homogeneity, translation equivariance and subadditivity is called






































































































































































































(2003) and B¨ auerle & M¨ uller (2006) for an extension to unbounded random variables.
The terminology “coherent” is somewhat ﬂawed in the sense that it may suggest that
any risk measure that is not “coherent” is always inadequate. It is worth to mention that
coherency is deﬁned with respect to a set of axioms, and no set is universally accepted.
Modifying the set of axioms regarded as desirable leads to other risk measures that may
be called “coherent” with just as much reason.
Convexity For any λ ∈ [0,1],  [λX + (1 − λ)Y] ≤ λ [X]+(1 − λ) [Y] whatever the
dependency structure of X and Y.
F¨ ollmer & Schied (2002), and independently Frittelli & Rosazza Gianin (2002), intro-
duced the concept of convexrisk measures, which satisfy the propertiesof monotonicity,
translation equivariance and convexity. It has been further developed by Kr¨ atschmer
(2005). The class of coherent risk measures can be characterized as the class of con-
vex risk measures that satisfy the positive homogeneity property. As the class of convex
risk measures is an extension of the class of coherent risk measures, it is sometimes
called the class of weakly coherent risk measures. It is worth to mention that the
work by Deprez & Gerber (1985) already contains many nice results on convex risk
measures.
Additivity for co-monotonic risks  [X + Y] =  [X]+ [Y] for co-monotonicrandom
variables X and Y.
Co-monotonicrisks are bets on the same event and in this sense neither of them provides
ahedgeagainsttheother.Becauseoftheno-hedgecondition,noreductionintherisk-load
is awarded for a combined policy, resulting in co-monotonic additivity.
Additivity for independent risks  [X + Y] =  [X] +  [Y] for independent random
variables X and Y.
Additivity for independent risks may be a reasonable requirement for a premium cal-
culation principle, since it ensures that the policyholder has no interest in splitting the
risk in independent components asking for coverage to several insurers. It is also justi-
ﬁed by premium computation from top to down; see, e.g., Borch (1962) or B¨ uhlmann
(1985). The most general representation of risk measures that are additive for in-
dependent random variables is due to Gerber & Goovaerts (1981) and is known as
the mixed Esscher principle. Despite the numerous appealing features of the Esscher
principle, it does not satisfy the strong monotonicity requirement. Counterexamples
have been provided by Van Heerwaarden, Kaas & Goovaerts (1989). This is why
Goovaerts, Kaas, Laeven & Tang (2004) provided a new axiomatic characterization
of risk measures that are additive for independent random variables, involving an axiom
that guarantees monotonicity. The obtained risk measure is a restricted version of the




































































































































































































6 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
1.4 Risk measures and economic decision under uncertainty
Goovaerts, Kaas, Dhaene & Tang (2004) gave several examples where evidently the
properties that risk measures should have are determined by the realities of the actuarial
applications (namely, insurance-reinsurance, premium calculation, premium calculation
from top to down, capital allocation, solvency margin and setting provisions). See also
Dhaene, Vanduffel, Tang, Goovaerts, Kaas & Vyncke (2004).
Insteadofstatingasetofaxiomsthatriskmeasuresshouldsatisfyandthendetermining
mathematically the corresponding functional representation, one could determine the
functional form of the risk measure via economic indifference arguments. For instance,
the equivalent utility premium principle deﬁned by B¨ uhlmann (1970) is obtained by
considering an insurer whose preferences are characterized by expected utility (EU, in
short).ThedistortionpremiumprincipleproposedbyDenneberg(1990)andWang(1996)
can be obtained via indifference arguments based on distortion utility (DU, in short).
The distortion-exponential premium principle has been similarly derived by Tsanakas
& Desli (2003) and Heilpern (2003) using rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU, in
short) theory. See also Luan (2001). The present paper follows Denuit, Dhaene & Van
Wouwe (1999) where only EU and DU were considered (with a brief excursion to
RDEU).
Utility theoriesaretypicallypresentedin anaxiomaticform.The axiomsareintended
as reasonable consistency requirements: the concept of rationality is embodied in the
axioms, with the possible addition of the postulate of risk aversion. The difference is
that here, axioms impose rational behavior in decision under uncertainty. As it was the
case for the sets of axioms deﬁning risk measures, the preference foundations typically
use intuitive axioms such as transitivity, which refer to directly meaningful empirical
properties of preferences, and technical axioms such as continuity, which describe the
structural richness of the model and serve to simplify the mathematical analysis.
Fishburn (1982) and Yaari (1987) considered the following four axioms on the pref-
erence relation  :
Objectivity If X and Y have the same distribution function then the decision-maker is
indifferent between X and Y,t h a ti s ,X   Y and Y   X both hold.
Weak order   is complete, transitive and reﬂexive.
Strong monotonicity If X  st Y then X   Y.
Continuity The set {Y|Y   X} is closed for every X, the closure being often meant with
respect to the topology of weak convergence,associated with the L1 norm.
Then, a ﬁfth axiom is added that speciﬁes the particular form of the indicator of prefer-
ences. Whereas there is a rather large consensus about the four axioms listed above, the
last one continues to be subject to debate. The EU axiomatization hinges on the inde-
pendence axiom, which requires preferences to be separable across mutually exclusive
events. Alternative theories proposed by Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler
(1989) replaced this condition by a type of co-monotonic independence axiom, an in-
tuitive and appealing condition requiring that the usual independence axiom only holds




































































































































































































In this paper,we will consider in additionto the classical EU and DU theories several
alternative paradigmsfor decision under uncertainty: the Choquet expected utility (CEU,
in short) theory proposed by Schmeidler (1989), the maximin expected utility (MEU, in
short) theory proposed by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) and the rank-dependentexpected
utility (RDEU, in short) theory proposed by Quiggin (1982). The application of the
actuarialequivalentutility pricingprinciplein these paradigmswill generatemost classes
of risk measures considered so far in the ﬁnancial mathematics literature.
1.5 Risk and uncertainty
Decision-making under risk and decision-making under uncertainty are differentiated
according to the condition that in the former case the probabilities of events are given
while in the latter case they are not. With regard to decision-making under uncertainty,
models have been introduced which associate some kind of probabilities to events.
Intheﬁnancialmathematicsliterature,andtheactuarialpapersintherealmofﬁnancial
mathematics, the probability distribution of a risk does not need to be ﬁxed (a risk is just
a random variabledeﬁned on a measurable space, and the probabilitymeasure can be left
unspeciﬁed). The majority of actuarial papers uses the framework of probability theory





remaining lifetime by a “more dangerous one” in order to generate a safety loading. We
will also see below that in economics terminology, for example, a coherent risk measure
is not a measure of risk but a measure of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is often represented with the help of capacities. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that the uncertaintya decision maker faces can be described by a non-emptyset of states,
denoted as  . This set may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Associated with   is the set of events,
taken to be a sigma-algebra of subsets of  , denoted by B. Capacities are real-valued
functions deﬁned on B that generalize the notion of probability distributions. Formally,
a capacity is a normalized monotonic set function. More precisely, C : B →[ 0,1] is
a capacity if C[∅] = 0, C[ ]=1a n df o ra n yA, B ∈ B, A ⊆ B ⇒ C[A]≤C[B].
Otherwise, the capacity has little structure. In particular, the sum of the capacities of two
disjoint subsets may exceed 1. Or the sum of the capacities of two subsets may be strictly
less than the capacity of the union of these sets. The capacity C is called coherent if there
exists a non-empty set M of probability measures P : B →[ 0,1] such that
C[A]= sup
P∈M
P[A] for all A ∈ B.
As we will see, coherent capacities are closely related to coherent risk measures.
To each capacity C we can associate a dual capacity. The dual capacity of C, denoted
as C, is deﬁned by



































































































































































































8 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
The dual capacity is useful when losses are considered instead of gains. Given a coherent
capacityC,anaturalandwidelyusedmeasureofthedegreeofuncertainty(orimprecision,













The interval (1.1) captures uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921). If C[A]=C[A],
the event A does not involve any vagueness and all priors P ∈ M agree on A.
Decisions under risk are usually performed in the EU or RDEU paradigms. In sit-
uations of uncertainty (i.e., in situations where there does not exist a given objective
probability distribution available to the decision-maker), these paradigms are replaced
by the subjective utility theory and the Choquet expected utility (CEU, in short), respec-
tively.
1.6 Aversion to risk and uncertainty
There are many notions of risk aversion. Chateauneuf & Cohen (2000) distinguish ﬁve
kinds of risk aversion: weak, monotonic, left monotonic, right monotonic and strong. In
this paper, we restrict ourselves to the following two standard concepts of risk aversion.
TheﬁrstonedeﬁnesanindividualtoberiskaverseifthesuregainE[X]isalwayspreferred
to the random prospect X itself. An alternative deﬁnition of risk aversion requires a risk
averse individual to behave according to the concave order, denoted as  cv, and deﬁned
by X  cv Y ⇔ E[φ(X)]≤E[φ(Y)] for all concave functions φ : R → R, provided the
expectations exist. This order extends the concept of mean preserving increase in risk.
Wethushaveaconceptofweakriskaversion(E[X]ispreferredover X)andaconcept
of strong risk aversion (X  cv Y ⇒ X is preferred over Y). It is interesting to note that
strong risk aversion is deﬁned with the help of a stochastic order relation. Relations like
the dispersive order have been used to deﬁne alternative attitudes towards risk; see, e.g.,
Chateauneuf & Cohen (2000) and Chateauneuf, Cohen & Meilijson (2004).
1.7 Outline of the paper
This paper aims to demonstrate that, as pointed out by Geman (1999), in the funda-
mental subject of ﬁnancial risk analysis, some valuable lessons may be drawn from
insurance. Actuaries have used indifference arguments based on economic theories for
decision under uncertainty for decades, after B¨ uhlmann (1970)introduced the equivalent
utility principle in the context of setting insurance premiums. Considering this simple
and appealing approach to risk measurement, most risk measures can be obtained in
a way that enlightens their intrinsic properties. Unfortunately, apart from some authors
including F¨ ollmer & Schied (2004), the close connections between risk measurement
and economic decision theory have been disregarded by ﬁnancial mathematicians, who





































































































































































































2 Equivalent utility risk measures in EU theory
2.1 EU theory
The classical expected utility (EU, in short) theory is identiﬁed by the independence
axiom. Every EU decision-maker possesses some utility function u(·) and acts in order




and X is preferred over Y if UEU[X|u]≥UEU[Y|u]. A classical reference for EU is
Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947). The subjective utility theory of Savage (1954) for
decision under uncertainty differs from EU only by its interpretation of the underlying
probability distribution P.
If the decision-maker, with initial wealth w and utility function u(·), has to choose
between random losses X and Y, then he compares UEU[w − X|u] with UEU[w − Y|u]
and chooses the loss which gives rise to the highest expected utility.
2.2 Risk aversion
The two deﬁnitions of risk aversion are equivalent under EU theory, where they both
coincide with the concavity of the utility function: for an EU decision-maker, weak risk
aversion implies automatically strong risk aversion.
Note that in the EU framework, the agent’s attitude towards risk and the agent’s at-
titude towards wealth are forever bonded together (since they are both derived from the
characteristics of u): risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility of wealth are syn-
onymous.Nevertheless, risk aversion expresses an attitude towards risk while decreasing
marginal utility expresses an attitude towards wealth. Thus, in EU theory, the concept of
risk aversion being encapsulated in the utility function is a property of attitudes towards
wealth rather than of attitudes towards risk.
2.3 Equivalent EU risk measures
Consider a decision-maker with initial wealth w and with a utility function u(·). Facing
a random loss X, he sets its price for coverage [X] as the solution of the equation
UEU






Condition (2.1) expresses that  [X] is fair in terms of utility: the right-hand side of (2.1)
represents the utility of not not covering X; the left-hand side of (2.1) represents the
expected utility of the decision-maker assuming the random ﬁnancial loss X. Therefore
(2.1)meansthat,providedanamountof [X]isobtainedwhen X iscovered,theexpected
utility of wealth with X is equal to the utility without X. Putting w = 0 and normalizing
the utility function u, we get the so-called “equivalent utility principle”:  [X] calculated










































































































































































































10 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
which can be interpreted as an equality between the expected utility of the income
 [X]−X and the utility of not accepting the risk.
If we assume that the moment generating function of X exists and that the utility




, x ≥ 0, (2.3)






Note that the exponential principle (2.4) also possesses an appealing interpretation in
terms of ruin theory; see, e.g., Kaas, Goovaerts, Dhaene & Denuit (2001, Section 5.2) or
Tsanakas & Desli (2003).
3 Equivalent utility risk measures in DU theory
3.1 DU theory
Under the same set of axioms but with a modiﬁed independenceaxiom, Yaari (1987)has
shown that there must exist a “distortion function” f such that a prospect X is valued at


















Here the distortion function f : [0,1] → [0,1] is non-decreasing with f(0) = 0a n d
f(1) = 1. Instead of using the tail probabilities FX(x), the decision-maker uses the
distorted tail probabilities f(FX(x)). Yaari’s model has been further developed by Ro¨ ell
(1987), and an alternative axiomatization is proposed in Guriev (2001). We also refer to
Carlier & Dana (2003) for interesting representations of UDU[X| f].
3.2 Risk aversion
Contrary to the EU case, the two conceptsof risk aversion are no more equivalentin DU.













































































































































































































3.3 Equivalent DU risk measures
Let us introduce the dual distortion function f for each distortion function f:
f(x) = 1 − f(1 − x), x ∈ [0,1]. (3.3)
The dual distortion function is again a distortion function. It is clear that f ≡ f and that
f convex ⇔ f concave. Furthermore, we have that UDU[−X| f]=− UDU[X| f].




























One immediately ﬁnds that f(FX(x)) is a non-increasingfunctionof x with values in the
interval[0,1].Theriskmeasure(3.5)canbeinterpretedasa“distortedexpectation”of X,
evaluated with a “distorted probability measure” in the sense of a Choquet-integral, see
Denneberg (1994). Risk measures (3.5) are often called distortion risk measures. In the
actuarial literature, distortion risk measures have been introduced by Denneberg (1990)
and Wang (1996). Axiomatic characterizations of insurance prices leading to distorted
premiumshavebeenproposedin Goovaerts&Dhaene(1998)andWang,Young&Panjer
(1997).
Many risk measures can be cast into the form (3.5). Let us give some prominent
examples.
Example 3.1 (Value-at-Risk) Forany pin(0,1),the p-quantileriskmeasure(orValue-
at-Risk) for a random variable X with given distribution function FX is deﬁned by
F−1
X (p) = inf {x ∈ R | FX(x) ≥ p},p∈ (0,1).Itcanbeshownthat F−1
X (p)corresponds
to (3.5) with distortion function
f(q) =

1 if q > 1 − p,
0 otherwise, for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.







X (q) dq, p ∈ (0,1). (3.6)











































































































































































































12 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
VaR’sarethe buildingblocksofthedistortionmeasures(3.5). Tosee this, itis enough
to replace f(FX(x)) by
 FX(x)
0 d f(q) in (3.5) and to revert the order of the integrations.





X (1 − q)d f(q). (3.8)
Note that when the distortion function f is differentiable, (3.8) can be rewritten as
 [X] = E

F−1




Formulas (3.8)–(3.9)show that the spectral risk measures of Acerbi (2002)are particular
cases of distortion risk measures. It can be further shown that coherent distortion risk
measures can be represented as mixtures of Tail-VaR’s, as pointed out by Inui & Kijima
(2005);see also Bassett, Koenker & Kordas(2004) for portfolio allocation with mixtures
of Tail-VaR’s, and Pﬂug (2002).
Distortion risk measures (3.5) with f concave are subadditive. The VaR therefore
fails to be subadditive. Danielsson, Jorgensen, Samorodnitsky,Sarma & de Vries (2005)
proved that for most practical applications VaR is subadditive. More precisely, they
demonstrated that VaR is subadditive for the relevant tails of all fat tailed distributions,
providedthe tails are not super fat (i.e., distributionswith so fat tails that the ﬁrst moment
is not deﬁned, such as the Cauchylaw, with tail index strictly less than 1). Inui, Kijima &
Kitano (2005) demonstrated the considerable bias of the VaR when used for a portfolio
with fat-tailed distributions.
Note that the class of distortionrisk measures (3.5)with concave f is a strict subclass
of the class of coherent risk measures, as is shown by the following example, taken from
Dhaene, Vanduffel, Tang, Goovaerts, Kaas & Vyncke (2004).
Example 3.3 (Dutch risk measure) For any randomvariable X, considerthe risk mea-
sure





This is a particular case of the “Dutch premium principle”, deﬁned for non-negative
random variables by Kaas, Van Heerwaarden & Goovaerts (1994).
The Dutch risk measure (3.10) is in general not additive for co-monotonic risks.
Hence, the Dutch risk measure (3.10) is an example of a risk measure that is coherent,
although it is not a distortion risk measure. The example also illustrates the fact that
coherent risk measures are not necessarily additive for co-monotonic risks.
4 Equivalent utility risk measures in CEU theory
4.1 CEU theory
A possible device to constructa capacityis to take a probabilitymeasure P on B together




































































































































































































a distorted probability measure. Conversely, for a given capacity C, one may wonder
whether there exists a probability measure P such that C = f ◦ P for some distortion
function f. The answer is in general negative: even if   is ﬁnite, there exist capacities
that cannot be obtained as non-decreasing transformations of probability measures. See,
e.g., Laeven (2005) for a simple counterexample.
Schmeidler (1989) modiﬁed the independence axiom into co-monotonic indepen-
dence. This gave rise to the Choquet expected utility (CEU, in short) theory. In CEU














where u is a utility of wealth function, C is a capacity and integration is in the sense of
Choquet; see Choquet (1953). The functional UCEU representing the preference relation
in the CEU model is thus the Choquet integral of u(X) with respect to the capacity C.
Note that the integrals on the right-hand side are Riemann integrals and they are well
deﬁnedsinceC[u(X)>t]isamonotonicfunctionint.Moreover,withC deﬁneddirectly
on events, there is no necessity for any intermediate evaluation of probabilities.
4.2 Uncertainty aversion
Risk refers to situations where the perceived likelihoods of events of interest can be rep-
resented by probability distributions, whereas uncertainty refers to situations where the
informationavailable to the decision-makeris too imprecise to be summarizedby a prob-
ability measure. Schmeidler’s (1989) CEU model is set in the framework of uncertainty
as deﬁned by Anscombe & Aumann (1963).
Duetotheabsenceofanobjectiveprobabilitydistribution,thedeﬁnitionofuncertainty
aversionhastobe basedontherandomvariablesthemselves.Schmeidler(1989)suggests
the idea that a convex combination of non-co-monotonic random variables smooths
the outcomes and makes an uncertainty-averse decision-maker better off. Speciﬁcally,
a decision-maker is uncertainty-averse if, for every pair of random variables X and Y,
if X is preferred over Y then αX + (1 − α)Y is preferred over Y for any α ∈[ 0,1].
The corresponding preferences are thus convex. Chateauneuf, Dana & Tallon (2000)
established that the decision-makeris uncertainty-averseif, and only if, the capacity C is
convex, that is,
C[A ∪ B]+C[A ∩ B]≥C[A]+C[B] for all A, B ∈ B, (4.1)
and the utility function u is concave. See also Leitner (2005) for related results.
If the reverse inequality holds in (4.1) then the capacity is called concave. Note that
if the dual capacity C is convex then C is concave. Furthermore, if C is convex then C
is concave and satisﬁes C[A]≤C[A] for any A ∈ B. The decision weights used in the




































































































































































































14 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
uncertainty neutrality. Probability distributions are special cases of capacities which are
both concave and convex. In the case of a distorted probability C[A]= f(P[A]), A ∈ B,
if f is convex then C is convex, and if f is concave then C is concave.





	P[A]≥C[A] for all A ∈ B

.
Since Schmeidler (1986), it is well-known that when the capacity is convex, its core is






This relates the CEU model to the MEU one, presented in the next section.
There are thus two properties of special interest concerning the uncertainty aversion
in CEU theory, namely the non-emptiness of the core and the convexity of the capac-
ity. Chateauneuf & Tallon (2002) considered the preference for diversiﬁcation in CEU.
The agent is said to exhibit preference for diversiﬁcation if, for any random variables
X1,...,Xn that are all considered as equivalent by the agent (i.e., UCEU[X1|u,C]=
···=UCEU[Xn|u,C] in CEU),
n
i=1 αiXi is preferred over X1 for any α1 ≥ 0,...,α n
≥ 0 with
n
i=1 αi = 1. This concept is obviously related to the convexity for risk mea-
sures. They established that preference for portfolio diversiﬁcation is equivalent to the
agent having a convex capacity and a concave utility function.
4.3 Equivalent CEU risk measures
Most often in the ﬁnancial mathematics literature, u is taken to be the identity function
and C is assumed to be convex. We then get for the preference indicator simply the













This integral is positively homogeneous,monotonic and translation equivariant.














−XdC. Equality holds for all random variables
if, and only if, C is additive. This inequality can be used to explain the bid-ask spread





−XdC are sometimes called lower and upper Choquet


















































































































































































































−XdC) is intimately connected with the
size of core(C).
After Denneberg (1990), the risk measure

XdC has been considered in insurance,
e.g., by Wang (1996),Wang, Young& Panjer (1997)and De Waegenaere, Kast & Lapied
(2003)underthe name of Choquetpricing.An overviewpaperon the applicabilityof this
type of risk measuresfor solvencypurposesis Dhaene,Vanduffel,Tang, Goovaerts,Kaas
& Vyncke (2004). Chateauneuf, Kast & Lapied (1996), Wang (2000, 2002) and Hamada
& Sherris (2003) used the same mechanism for pricing in ﬁnancial markets; see also
Pelsser (2004). This risk measure is continuous, monotonic and co-monotonic additive.
It is subadditive if, and only if, C is concave; it is superadditive for convex C.
Castagnoli, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004) noticed that the presence on the market
of assets without bid-ask spreads turns Choquet prices into standard expectations. More
precisely, if an insurance company sets the safety loading according to a probability
distortion in agreement with the increasing concave order  icv (deﬁned by X  icv Y ⇔
E[φ(X)]≤E[φ(Y)] for all non-decreasing concave functions φ : R → R, provided the
expectations exist) then it assigns either strictly positive safety loading to all contracts
or zero safety loading to all contracts. Despite its theoretical interest, this result should
not prevent the use of Choquet risk measures (since actuarial risk theory imposes strictly
positive safety loading, to avoid almost certain ruin).
Kadane & Wasserman (1996) considered   =[ 0,1], B the Borel subsets of   and
symmetric capacities (that is, capacities C such that µ[A]=µ[B]⇒C[A]=C[B],
with µ the Lebesgue measure). They characterized coherent symmetric capacities (as
those with doubly star-shaped distortion functions; see Kadane & Wasserman (1996) for
a deﬁnition). If the capacity is furtherassumed to be concavethen Section 4 in Kadane &
Wasserman(1996)provesthatthedistortionfunctions f(p) = min{p/α,1}correspondto
the extreme points of the set of all distortion functions.This directly implies that spectral
risk measures can be represented as mixtures of Tail-VaR.
Note however that Marinacci (1999) proved that symmetric and coherent Choquet
capacities turn out to be additive under a fairly mild condition. More speciﬁcally, the
existence of a single non-trivial unambiguous event (in the sense that the interval (1.1)
reduces to a single point) is enoughto make them additive. This is a very strong property
since excluding the existence of even a single non-trivial unambiguous event seems in
general a very stringent assumption (recall that in the additive case, all events are unam-
biguous). This is obviously related to the result of Castagnoli, Maccheroni & Marinacci
(2004) mentioned above.
5 Equivalent utility risk measures in MEU theory
5.1 MEU theory
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) suggested the Maximin expected utility (MEU, in short)
model, also called multiple prior model. In this context, preference relations have a rep-









































































































































































































16 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
where u is a utility function and M is a closed and convex set of additive probability
measures. Thus, CEU coincides with MEU when the set M is the core of C,t h a t
is, UCEU[X|u,C]=UMEU[X|u,core(C)]. Moreover, when an arbitrary (closed and
convex) set M is given and one deﬁnes C[A]=inf{P[A]|P ∈ M}, C is not necessarily
convex. Furthermore, even if C happens to be convex, M does not have to be its core.
In addition to the usual assumptions on the preference relation such as transitivity,
completeness,continuityandweakmonotonicity,Gilboa&Schmeidler(1989)postulated
uncertainty aversion and certainty-independence to derive MEU theory. The certainty-
independence axiom is weaker than standard independence (since only mixings with
degenerate distribution functions corresponding to certainty are considered).
5.2 Equivalent MEU risk measures
Takingu(x) = x givestheclassofcoherentriskmeasuresinthesenseofArtzner,Delbaen,


















Risk measures of this type have been used by Castagnoli, Maccheroni & Marinacci
(2002) to compute insurance premiums. Huber (1981) already considered functionals
(5.1) in robust statistics. The elements of M are called generalized scenarios in Artzner,
Delbaen, Eber & Heath (1999). Huber (1981) proved for the case of a ﬁnite set  ,t h a t
a risk measure is coherent if, and only if, it has an upper expectation representation. This
result remains valid for more general spaces (see Delbaen (2002)), though in that case
“the important conceptual aspects are buried under a mass of technical complications of
a measure theoretic and topological nature,” as is stated by Huber (1981).
Risk measures of the form (5.1) have been considered for a long time in actuarial
science,especially when M isa momentspace (ormoregenerally,when M isdeﬁnedby
asetofintegralconstraints);see,e.g.,Section5.3ofGoovaerts,DeVijlder&Haezendonck
(1984) for a detailed account.
6 Equivalent utility risk measures in RDEU theory
6.1 RDEU theory
In this section, we present a theory which combines the EU and the DU assumptions, to
a certain extent. The rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU, in short) theory was ﬁrst
proposed by Quiggin (1982). It is a generalization of EU and DU theories that preserves
the properties of continuity, transitivity and weak monotonicity. The name comes from
the fact that cumulative probabilities are transformed, so that the new weight assigned




































































































































































































the set of axioms connected with RDEU since the modiﬁed version of the independence
axiom appearing in Quiggin (1982) does not admit a clear behavioral interpretation. For
other sets of axioms, see e.g. Chateauneuf & Wakker (1999) and Abdellaoui (2002). The
RDEU approach combines the utility function u(·) from EU with a distortion function
f(·) from DU. For interesting applications to insurance, see, e.g., Chateauneuf, Cohen &
Meilijson (1997).
Under the rank-dependent expected utility model, a decision-maker is characterized
by a utility function u (that plays the role of utility on certainty) in conjunction with
a distortion function f (that plays the role of a probability perception function). Such












withasimilarexpressionforY.Itiseasytoseethatif f(p) = p,wegettheEUmodel,that
is, URDEU[X|u,identity]=UEU[X|u], whereas if u(x) = x we get the DU paradigm,
that is, URDEU[X|identity, f]=UDU[X| f].
Just as in EU, the utility function u is normally taken to be concave or linear. There is
lessconsensusconcerningtheappropriateshapeforthedistortionfunction f.Fordescrip-
tive purposes, Quiggin (1982) originally proposed an S-shaped function, overweighting
extremelow probabilityoutcomes.Other authorssuggested to considerconvexdistortion
functions f (this property is akin to risk aversion, as shown above).
Simple distortion functions are those given by the one-parameter family fα(p) =












This family has been considered, e.g., in Bassett, Koenker & Kordas (2004).
Remark 6.1 FollowingtheusageofKnight(1921)indistinguishinguncertainty(i.e.,am-
biguity)andrisk,Gilboa(1987)andSchmeidler(1989)donottakeobjectiveprobabilities
asgivenbut considersubjectiveprobabilities.Capacitiesare then usedandprospectsare
compared on the basis of Choquet integrals. Wakker (1990) established that, provided
weak monotonicityis fulﬁlled,thisapproachis equivalenttoRDEU. Thesubtle difference
between the two approaches can be summarized as follows: in RDEU, decision-makers
know the objective probabilities but distort them when choosing among risky prospects.
In CEU, decision-makers use their own (possibly non-additive) subjective probabilities,
derived from some capacity.
6.2 Risk aversion
As RDEU distinguishes attitudes towards outcomes and attitudes towards probabilities,
risk aversion in RDEU must combine two different concepts. First, there is outcome risk



































































































































































































18 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
the standardnotionofrisk aversionfromthe EU theorydeﬁnedbyconcavityofthe utility
function. Second, there are attitudes speciﬁc to probability preferences. Risk aversion
in probability weighting corresponds to pessimism: the decision-maker adopts a set of
decision weights that yields an expected value for a transformed risky prospect lower
than the mathematical expectation. An alternative, more restrictive, characterization of
pessimism leads to a deﬁnition of risk aversion in terms of  icv. Note that the restriction
toconcaveutilityfunctionsdoesnotprohibitriskseekingbehaviorsinRDEU.Itis indeed
possible to model risk seeking with diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
The transformation f may be regarded as pessimistic if f(p) ≤ p for all p.T h i s













that is, E[X] is preferredover X. Therefore,concavityof u and pessimism are reasonable
conditions for risk aversion.
Let us now turn to the deﬁnition of risk aversion as preservation of  icv. It can be
shown that a decision-maker will be consistent with  icv if, and only if, u is concave and
f is convex (see, e.g., Quiggin (1993)). Convexity of the distortion function f implies
astrongformofpessimismthatcanberoughlysummarizedasfollows:theworstoutcome
is overweighted most, and the best outcome underweighted most. Unlike the situation in
EU theory, preservation of  icv is not equivalent to preference for certainty over risk.
6.3 Equivalent RDEU risk measures
Heilpern (2003) and Tsanakas & Desli (2003) introduce a class of risk measures which
can be considered as the solutions of the indifference equations for RDEU. Lemma 1
in Heilpern (2003) establishes that provided u is non-decreasing and concave,
URDEU[X|u, f]≤u(UDU[X| f]) whatever the distortion function f. The equivalent








Ingeneral,there is noexplicitsolutiontothis equation.A notableexceptionis with utility














The equivalentutility risk measures solving(6.1)are great variety.Providedu is non-
decreasingandconcaveand f isaconvexdistortionfunction,Heilpern(2003,Theorem1)
proved that the resulting risk measure is translation equivariant, preserves  icx and does
not entail unjustiﬁed safety loading, that is  [c]=c for all real constants c.I fu(x) = x,
it ismoreoverpositivelyhomogeneous,co-monotonicadditiveandsubadditive.Note that
in this case, we are back to the DU paradigm. It is additive for independent random





































































































































































































In particular, the risk measure (6.2) is additive for independent random variables
only if f(p) = p (that is, in the EU case). Moreover, the risk measure (6.2) is strongly
monotonic,translation equivariantand convex.Tsanakas& Desli (2003)studied in detail
the properties of this risk measure regarding sensitivity to portfolio size and to risk
aggregation. They conclude that this risk measure behaves approximately as a coherent
risk measure for smaller portfolios of risks, while for larger portfolios the risk aversion
inducedby the utility function becomes prevalent,and the sensitivity to liquidity and risk
aggregation issues gradually increases.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have derived the great majority of the classical risk measures using
the actuarial equivalent utility principle in different theories for decision under risk and
uncertainty. As such it makes clear the economic rationale behind these risk measures.
It is now also clear that risk measures encountered in the ﬁnancial mathematics
literature correspond to linear utility of wealth functions. Disregarding utility of wealth
does not always seem reasonable from an economic viewpoint. The linearity of the
utility function makes risk measures insensitive to liquidity risk: for example, according
to positive homogeneity, changes in the size of a portfolio, given that its composition
is unchanged, should only affect a proportional change in capital requirements. This
disregardsthatverylargeportfoliosmightproduceverylargelossesthat,inturn,canmake
it difﬁcult for the holder of the portfolio to raise sufﬁcient cash to meet his obligations.
This has been pointed out, e.g., by Dhaene, Goovaerts & Kaas (2003).
The RDEU framework simultaneously accounts for utility functions and distorted
probabilities:theagentisequippedwithbothautilityfunctionandaprobabilitydistortion.
Risk measures emerging from RDEU inherit properties from both EU and DU: in the
case of a linear utility functionequivalentDU risk measures are obtainedas special cases
while, in the case of a linear probability distortion function, equivalent EU risk measures
are found. In general, the properties of equivalent RDEU risk measures lie somewhere
in between of these two extreme cases. Their general behavior is nevertheless difﬁcult to
determine since it is difﬁcult to know at which point the utility or the distortion function
will have the most inﬂuence. As pointed out by Tsanakas & Desli (2003), equivalent
RDEU risk measures are convex under mild conditions. Note that CEU is even more
general.
In particular, the distortion exponential risk measure (6.2) proposed by Tsanakas &
Desli (2003) combines the properties of the DU equivalent and (2.4) risk measures. It
is obtained as a special case of equivalent RDEU risk measures when an exponential
utility function (2.3) is used. It inherits properties from both (2.4) and DU equivalent
risk measures. Whether the properties of the distortion exponential risk measures are
closer to those of (2.4) or those of equivalent DU risk measures depends to some extent
on the underlying risks that are examined. For relatively small portfolios, the distortion
exponentialrisk measure is approximatelyequivalentto the equivalentDU risk measures
andinheritstheirproperties.Forlargerportfolios,forwhichliquidityandriskaggregation
becomeanissue,theeffectoftheutilityfunction(2.3)becomesprevalentandthedistortion



































































































































































































20 Denuit -- Dhaene -- Goovaerts -- Kaas -- Laeven
portfolio is depends on the speciﬁc situation and preferences of its holder. It can be
controlled by modifying the risk aversion parameter of the exponential function. The
numerical illustrations in Tsanakas & Desli (2003) support this evidence.
Alternativesto(6.2)canbeobtainedbysubstitutingotherclassesofutilityfunctionsto
the exponentialone (2.3). One could think of CARA (for constantabsolute risk aversion)
utility functions given by u(x) = xγ
γ for γ  = 0a n dl nx when γ = 0 that are often used
in economic applications.
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